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Robustness of Nash Equilibria in Network Games
Laura Arditti, Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani, and Martina Vanelli
Abstract— We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash
equilibria for network games against perturbations of the
players’ utility functions. We first derive a simple character-
ization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum
magnitude of a perturbation that makes a Nash equilibrium
of the original game stop being so in the perturbed game.
Then, we investigate what the maximally robust equilibria are in
some standard network games such as the coordination and the
anti-coordination game. Finally, as an application, we provide
some sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria
in network games with a mixture of coordinating and anti-
coordinating games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robustness of Nash equilibria in game theory is typically
addressed by introducing more refined equilibria concepts
that can be proven to be stable with respect to certain families
of perturbations (e.g. noisy payoffs, incomplete information
games) [1], [2]. In particular, robustness is considered as a
quality that either is present or not for a certain game and a
specific equilibrium.
Our study goes into a quite different direction and gives
a twofold contribution.
First, we propose a way of measuring robustness of a Nash
equilibrium for any strategic form game that is much in the
spirit of robust control theory as it represents the minimum
energy that a perturbation of payoffs must possess in order
to break the equilibrium. This quantity can then be dually
characterized as the result of a straightforward optimization
problem involving payoffs. Remarkably, for the family of
potential games, the most robust equilibria do not necessarily
coincide with the maxima of the potential. This is in sharp
contrast with the results in [2] where robustness is studied
in the context of games with incomplete information.
Second, we consider games where players are split into
two classes and we use this notion of robustness to in-
vestigate the structure of Nash equilibria of the sub-game
obtained by freezing players in one of the two classes to
some prescribed value. In particular, we study conditions
under which such Nash equilibrium is independent from
the freezing value. Finally, we apply this machinery to find
explicit examples of Nash equilibria for games over networks
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consisting of a mixture of coordination and anti-coordination
games. Such games have attracted much attention lately [3]
and, as they are not potential, the existence of Nash equilibria
is not guaranteed.
We now briefly outline the content of this paper. Section II
introduces all necessary notions of game theory. Section III
introduces the fundamental notion of robustness, it proposes
a simple formula to compute it and present a number of
examples. Section IV studies robustness issues for Nash
equilibria of sub-games of a given game and final Section
V focuses on network games and presents an application to
study Nash equilibria for a network game consisting of a
mixture of coordination and anti-coordination players.
II. BACKGROUND
Throughout the paper, we shall consider strategic form
games with finite nonempty player set V and finite nonempty
action set Ai for each player i in V . We shall denote by
X = ∏i∈V Ai the space of all players’ strategy profiles
and, for every player i in V , let X−i =
∏
j∈V\{i}Aj be
the set of strategy profiles of all players except for player
i. As customary, for a strategy profile x in X , the strategy
profile of all players except for i is denoted by x−i in X−i.
We shall refer to two strategy profiles x and y in X as i-
comparable and write x ∼i y when x−i = y−i, i.e., when x
and y coincide except for possibly in their i-th entry. Let each
player i in V be equipped with a utility function ui : X → R .
We shall identify a game with player set V and strategy
profile space X with the vector u assembling all the players’
utilities. The set of all games with player set V and strategy
profile space X , to be denoted by U , is isomorphic to the
vector space RV×X : we shall equip it with the infinity norm
||ui||∞ = max
x∈X
|ui(x)| , i ∈ V ,
||u||∞ = max
i∈V
||ui||∞ .
For a game u in U , define
χui (x) = miny∼ix
y 6=x
{ui(x)− ui(y)} , (1)
for every player i in V and strategy profile x in X .
Definition 1: A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for a
game u in U is a strategy profile x∗ in X such χui (x∗) ≥ 0,
for every player i in V .
While not all games have Nash equilibria, some important
classes of games are known that always admit Nash equilib-
ria. One of them is the class of potential games [4].
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Definition 2: A game u in U is said to be potential if there
exists a potential function φ : X → R such that
ui(x)− ui(y) = φ(x)− φ(y) , (2)
for every player i in V and every pair of i-comparable
strategy profiles x ∼i y in X .
Throughout the paper, we will consider directed graphs
G = (V, E) defined as the pair of a finite set of nodes E and
a finite set of directed links E ⊆ V ×V and we shall denote
by Ni = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E} the out-neighborhood of a
node i in G. We will consider games on graphs according
to the following definition, which was first introduced by
Kearns [5].
Definition 3: A game u in U is said to be graphical on a
graph G = (V, E) if the utility of each player i in V depends
only on her own action and on the actions of fellow players
in her neighborhood in G, i.e., if
ui(x) = ui(y) , ∀x, y ∈ X s.t. xNi∪{i} = yNi∪{i} .
(3)
A relevant class of graphical games is that of pairwise-
separable games, obtained by combining pairwise interac-
tions according to the following definition.
Definition 4: A G-game u in U is said to be pairwise-
separable if the utility of player i in V is in the form
ui(x) =
∑
j∈Ni
uij(xi, xj) ∀x ∈ X , (4)
where uij : Ai ×Aj → R for (i, j) in E .
Example 1 (Network coordination and anti-coordination):
For an undirected weighted graph G = (V, E ,W ), and a
binary vector ξ in {−1,+1}V , let u be a game with player
set V , binary action set Ai = {−1,+1} for every player i
in V and utilities
ui(x) = ξi
∑
j∈V
Wijxixj , ∀x ∈ X . (5)
For ξ = +1, this is known as the pure (homogeneous)
network coordination game whereas for ξ = −1 this the pure
(homogeneous) network anti-coordination game. Notice that
by defining uij(xi, xj) = ξiWijxixj it immediately follows
that the network coordination and anti-coordination games
on a graph G are pairwise separable.
In both cases ξ = ±1, this is a potential game with
potential
φ(x) = ±1
2
∑
i,j∈V
Wijxixj . (6)
Notice that for the pure network coordination game (ξ = +1)
the consensus profiles ±1 are always global maximum points
of the potential (6) (with + sign) on X , and hence are Nash
equilibria. In fact, there might be other Nash equilibria, as is
known [6] that every x in X such that V+ = {i : xi = +1}
and V− = {i : xi = −1} are both cohesive (c.f. Definition
6) is a Nash equilibrium for the pure network coordination
game.
On the other hand, the pure network anti-coordination
game (ξ = −1) is also a potential game, hence it admits at
least two Nash equilibria ±x∗ that are the global maximum
points of the potential (6) (with − sign) on X .
In contrast, when ξ 6= ±1 is not a constant vector, we
obtain a mixed network coordination/anti-coordination game
(cf. [3], [7], [8]). Notice that if the graph G is connected
the mixed coordination/anti-coordination game is never a
potential game [9]. In particular, for |V| = 2 this reduces
to the well known discoordination game [9, Example 5],
which does not admit any pure strategy Nash equilibria.
In Corollary 1 we shall prove that a sufficient condition
for the existence of Nash equilibria of the mixed network
coordination/anti-coordination game is that the set Vc = {i ∈
V : ξi = +1} is cohesive in G.
III. MARGIN OF ROBUSTNESS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we introduce the notion of margin of
robustness for pure strategy Nash equilibria of finite games,
defined as the infimum magnitude of a perturbation that
makes the configuration lose the Nash equilibrium property.
We will then compute the margin of robustness of the Nash
equilibria in some examples, showing in particular how the
consensus configurations are the most robust Nash equilibria
for a pure network coordination game. We will also show
how, for potential games, the margin of robustness of Nash
equilibria is not aligned with the value of the potential
function, as the global maximum points of the latter may
in fact be the least robust Nash equilibrium of the game.
We start with the following simple result that will prove
very useful in the rest of the paper.
Lemma 1: Let u in U be a finite game and x∗ in X a
Nash equilibrium. Then, for every perturbation δ in U such
that
||δi||∞ ≤ 1
2
χui (x
∗) , ∀i ∈ V , (7)
x∗ is a Nash equilibrium for the perturbed game u˜ = u+ δ.
Proof: For every perturbation δ in U satisfying (7), we
have,
δi(y)− δi(x∗) ≤ 2||δi||∞ ≤ ui(x∗)− ui(y) ,
for every player i in V and strategy profile y 6= x∗ such that
y ∼i x∗. The above implies that
u˜i(y) = ui(y) + δi(y) ≤ ui(x∗) + δi(x∗) = u˜i(x∗) ,
for every player i in V and strategy profile y ∼i x∗, thus
showing that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium for the perturbed game
u˜ = u+ δ.
We now formalize the notion of margin of robustness for
a Nash equilibrium of a finite game.
Definition 5: The margin of robustness µu(x∗) of a Nash
equilibrium x∗ in finite game u in U is the infimum of the
magnitude ||δ||∞ of perturbations δ in U such that x∗ is not
a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game u˜ = u+ δ.
The following result provides an explicit characterization
of the margin of robustness for Nash equilibria of a finite
game, as defined above.
-1 +1
-1 a,a c,d
+1 d,c b,b
Fig. 1: Normal form representation of the prisoner dilemma
game.
Proposition 1 (Margin of robustness of Nash equilibria):
Let u be a finite game and let x∗ in X be a Nash equilibrium
of u. Then, the margin of robustness of x∗ is
µu(x
∗) =
1
2
min
i∈V
χui (x
∗) . (8)
Proof: On the one hand, Lemma 1 implies that
µu(x
∗) ≥ 1
2
min
i∈V
χui (x
∗) . (9)
On the other hand, let i in V achieve the minimum in the
righthand side of (8), and let y ∼i x∗, y 6= x∗ achieve the
minimum in the righthand side of (1) with x = x∗. Then,
for an arbitrarily small ε > 0, let δ be a perturbation in U
such that
δi(y) = −δi(x∗) = 1
2
(ui(x
∗)− ui(y)) + ε ,
δi(x) = 0 for every x in X \ {y, x∗}, and δj(x) = 0 for
every j in V \ {i} and x in X . Then,
δi(y)− δi(x∗) = ui(x∗)− ui(y) + 2ε
so that
u˜i(y) = ui(y) + δi(y) = ui(x
∗) + δi(x∗) + 2ε > u˜i(x∗) ,
thus showing that x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium of the
perturbed game u˜ = u + δ. Observe that this perturbation
has infinity norm
||δ||∞ = 1
2
min
i∈V
χui (x
∗) + ε ,
so that by the arbitrariness of ε > 0 we get
µu(x
∗) ≤ 1
2
χui (x
∗) . (10)
The claim then follows by combining (9) and (10).
In the remaining of this section we provide various exam-
ples characterizing the robustness of relevant games.
Example 2: Consider a symmetric 2-player binary action
game u with utilities as in Figure 1, where
c > b > a > d . (11)
This is the classical Prisoner Dilemma game whereby action
−1 is to be interpreted as “Defect” and action +1 as
“Cooperate”. As known, −1 is a strictly dominant action
for both players in this game, so that there is a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium x∗ = (−1,−1). For both players
{1, 2} we have that χu1 (x∗) = χu2 (x∗) = a − d so that the
margin of stability is
µu(x
∗) = a− d ,
i.e., the difference between the utility that players get when
they both defect minus the one that a player gets when she
cooperates and the other one defects.
Example 3 (One shot public good game): For an undi-
rected graph G = (V, E) and a scalar value c such that
0 < c < 1, consider the game with player set V coinciding
with the node set of G and utilities
ui(x) = 1− c if xi = 1
ui(x) = 1 if xi = 0, xj = 1 for some j ∈ Ni
ui(x) = 0 if xi = 0, xj = 0 for all j ∈ Ni .
This is known as the one shot public good game [10]. Its
pure strategy Nash equilibria are all those strategy profiles
x∗ in {0, 1}V such that {i ∈ V : xi = 1} is a maximal
independent set of G. For every such Nash equilibrium x∗,
it is easily computed that
χui (x
∗) =
{
1− (1− c) = c if x∗i = 0
1− c if x∗i = 1 ,
so that the margin of robustness is
µu(x
∗) =
1
2
min
i∈V
χui (x
∗)
=
1
2
min{c, (1− c)} .
In particular, this means that all Nash equilibria of the one
shot public good game have the same margin of robustness.
Example 4 (Robustness of network coordination games):
For a weighted undirected graph G = (V, E ,W ), consider
the pure network coordination game with utilities (5) with
ξi = +1 for every player i in V . For this game, as observed
in Example 1, the consensus configurations x∗ = ±1 are
both Nash equilibria. In either such configuration, if a player
i changes her action from x∗i to −x∗i , her utility decreases
by twice her degree. This implies that
χui (x
∗) = ui(x∗i , x
∗
−i)− ui(−x∗i , x∗−i) = 2wi . (12)
Then, Proposition 1 implies that the margin of robustness for
x∗ = ±1 coincides with the minimum degree
µu(±1) = min
i∈V
wi . (13)
In fact, in every other Nash equilibrium x∗ of the pure
network coordination game, it is easily seen that if a player
i changes her action from x∗i to −x∗i , her utility decreases
by no more than twice her degree.
χui (x
∗) = ui(x∗i , x
∗
−i)− ui(−x∗i , x∗−i) ≤ 2wi ,
so that
µu(x
∗) ≤ min
i∈V
wi ∀ Nash equilibrium x∗ . (14)
It follows from (13) and (14), that the maximally robust Nash
equilibra for the pure network coordination game coincide
with the the consensus configurations, which are also the
maximum points of the potential. As we shall see in the
following examples, this far from being true in general.
Fig. 2: Graph for the network anti-coordination game of
Example 5.
(a) Nash equilibrium (15). (b) Nash equilibrium (16).
Fig. 3: Two Nash equilibria for the anti-coordination game
of Example 5. The Nash equilibrium in (a) achieves the
maximum value φ(x∗) = 6 of the potential function and
has margin of robustness µu(x∗) = 0. The Nash equilibrium
in (a) achieves a lower value φ(x∗) = 4 of the potential
function and has margin of robustness µu(x∗) = 1.
Example 5 (Robustness of network anti-coordination):
Let G be the simple graph in Figure 2 and let u be the
anti-coordination game on G, with utilities given by 5 with
ξi = −1 for every player i in V .
It is easily verified that the potential (6) (with − sign)
achieves its maximum value φ(x∗) = 6 in the strategy
profiles
x∗ = ±(1,−1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1) , (15)
that are illustrated in Figure 3 (a). Hence the strategy profiles
in (15) are Nash equilibria. For them we have that
χu1 (x
∗) = 0, χu2 (x
∗) = 1, χu3 (x
∗) = 3, χu4 (x
∗) = 3,
χu5 (x
∗) = 1, χu6 (x
∗) = 3, χu7 (x
∗) = 1 ,
so that their margin of robustness is µu(x∗) = 0. Indeed,
they are non-strict Nash equilibria as player 1 might switch
her action without changing her utility.
In contrast, consider the strategy profiles
x∗ = ±(1, 1,−1,−1,−1, 1, 1) , (16)
which are illustrated in Figure 3 (b).
For x∗ as in (16), we can compute φ(x∗) = 4 and
χu1 (x
∗) = 2, χu2 (x
∗) = 1, χu3 (x
∗) = 1, χu4 (x
∗) = 1,
χu5 (x
∗) = 1, χu6 (x
∗) = 1, χu7 (x
∗) = 1 ,
showing that these are Nash equilibria with margin of
robustness µu(x∗) = 1.
Observe that Example 5 illustrates how the margin of ro-
bustness of Nash equilibria in potential games is generally
not aligned with the potential function, as the maximally
robust Nash equilibria might not be the maximum points of
the potential function. In contrast, in Example 4 we showed
that the maximally robust Nash equilibria of a pure network
coordination game coincide with the global maximum points
of its potential. In fact, one may consider the pure network
coordination game an exception rather than the norm.
IV. ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIA IN SUBGAMES
In this section, we focus perturbations having a certain
structure emerging from considering the original game as a
sub-game of another one with a larger set of players. Partic-
ularly, we investigate conditions guaranteeing the existence
of a Nash equilibrium that does not depend on the behavior
of the players not in the original game. As we shall see in
the following section, the results obtained here will prove
particularly useful in the analysis of network games.
We start by introducing some further notation. For a
nonempty subset of players R ⊆ V , let S = V \ R , be
the complementary set of players. We shall consider the
space of games UR with player set R and strategy profile
space XR =
∏
i∈RAi. We can canonically identify X with
XR × XS and consequently decompose every x in X , as
x = (xR, xS) with xR in XR and xS in XS . Observe that
UR can be interpreted as a subspace of U and, with a slight
abuse of notation, we shall define the distance between a
game u in U and a game u˜ in UR as
||ui − u˜i||∞ = max
x∈X
|ui(x)− u˜i(xR)| , ∀i ∈ R ,
||u− u˜||∞ = max
i∈R
||ui − u˜i||∞ .
For a given game u in U , we shall consider the following
games in UR: for every z in XS let the game u(z) in UR
have utilities
u
(z)
i (y) = ui(y, z) , ∀y ∈ XR , (17)
for every player i in R. It will also prove useful to consider
the following averaged game uR in UR having utilities
u¯Ri (y) =
1
|XS |
∑
z∈XS
u
(z)
i (y) , ∀y ∈ XR , (18)
for every player i in R. Games u(z) and u¯R will be called
R-restricted games.
We now study conditions under which there exists a
configuration in XR that is a Nash equilibrium for all games
u(z). We state the following result.
Proposition 2: For a game u in U and a nonempty subset
of players R ⊆ V , let y∗ in XR be a Nash equilibrium of
the game u in UR defined in (18). If
χui (y
∗) ≥ 2||ui − ui||∞ , ∀i ∈ R , (19)
then y∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game u(z) in UR, for
every z in XS .
Proof: For every z in XS , define the perturbation
δ(z) = u(z) − u ∈ UR .
Then, observe that
||ui − ui||∞ = max
z∈XS
||δ(z)i ||∞ ,
for every player i in R, so that (19) implies that
||δ(z)i ||∞ ≤
1
2
χui (y
∗)
for every z in XS . It then follows from Lemma 1 that y∗ is
a Nash equilibrium of the game u(z) for every z in XS .
Proposition 2 provides sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence of a uniform Nash equilibrium y∗ in XR of the game
obtained by restricting u to a subset of players R; under
such conditions y∗ is a Nash equilibrium in all games u(z)
in UR obtained by freezing the strategies of all players in
the complementary set S = V \ R. In the next section, it
will become apparent how this result may prove very useful
in the analysis of network games.
We conclude this section with the following result that
may be thought of as a sort of converse of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3: Let u in U be a finite game and x∗ in X
a Nash equilibrium for u. Then, for every nonempty subset
of players R ⊆ V , the projection x∗R is a Nash equilibrium
for every game u˜ in UR, such that
||u− u˜||∞ ≤ µu(x∗) . (20)
Proof: For every z in XS , define the games u(z) and
δ(z) in UR with utilities
u
(z)
i (y) = ui(y, z) , δ
(z)
i (y) = u˜i(y)− u(z)i (y) ,
for every player i in R and strategy profile y in XR. Now,
let y∗ = x∗R and z
∗ = x∗S . Then, clearly y
∗ is a Nash
equilibrium of u(z
∗). Moreover, (21) implies that
||δ(z∗)||∞ ≤ µu(z∗)(y∗) ,
so that, by Proposition 1 y∗ is a Nash equilibrium of u˜.
V. ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIA IN NETWORK GAMES
This section focuses on pairwise network games u as per
Definition 4. More specifically, for a binary partition V =
R∪S of the player set, we show how the existence of a Nash
equilibrium x∗ of the network game u can be guaranteed by
sufficient conditions that involve the robustness and structure
of the sub-games in UR and US , respectively, as well as
on the strength of the network coupling between the sets
R and S. Our general results will find a direct application
for the mixed network coordination/anti-coordination games
introduced in Example 1.
Consider a directed graph G = (V, E) and a pairwise-
separable G-game u in U with utilities as in (4) for given
pairwise utilities uij : Ai × Aj → R for every (i, j) in E .
First, the following result follows from Proposition 2.
Proposition 4: Let R ⊆ V be a nonempty subset of
players and S = V \R. Let u in UR be the game defined in
(18) and y∗ ∈ XR be a Nash equilibrium for u. If
χui (y
∗) ≥MwSi , (21)
for every i in R, where
M = max
i∈R,j∈S
||uij ||∞ , wSi = |Ni ∩ S| ,
then y∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game u(z) in UR, for
every z in XS .
Proof: For every i in R we have
||ui − ui||∞ = max
x∈X
1
|XS |
∑
z
(ui(xR, xS)− ui(xR, z))
= max
x∈X
1
|XS |
∑
z
∑
j
(uij(xi, xj)− uij(xi, zj))
≤ 2MwSi ,
where the summation indices z and j run over XS and Ni ∩
S, respectively. Hence, (19) holds true and the claim then
follows from Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 readily implies the following:
Theorem 1: For a pairwise separable network game u on a
graph G = (V, E), and a nonempty subset of players R ⊆ V ,
let u in UR be the game defined in (18) and S = V \ R. If
(a) u¯ admits a Nash equilibrium y∗ in XR satisfying (21);
and
(b) for every y ∈ XR the game u(y) in US admits Nash
equilibria z∗(y);
then x∗ = (y∗, z∗(y∗)) in X is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of u.
Proof: It follows from assumption (a) and Proposition
4 that y∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game u(z) in UR for
every z ∈ XS . Hence, in particular, y∗ is a Nash equilibrium
of the game u(z
∗(y∗)), while assumption (b) guarantees that
z∗(y∗) is Nash equilibrium of u(y
∗). It then follows that
x∗ = (y∗, z∗(y∗)) is a Nash equilibrium of u.
In order to apply Theorem 1 in concrete examples, the
following result proves useful in order to guarantee that
assumption (b) holds true.
Proposition 5: Assume that G = (V, E) is undirected and
for every (i, j) in S × S, the pairwise two-player game
between i and j with utilities uij(xi, xj) and uji(xj , xi) is
a symmetric potential game. Then, for every y ∈ XR, u(y)
in US is a potential game, hence it admits at least one Nash
equilibrium z∗(y) in XS .
Proof: For every undirected link {i, j}, let
φij(xi, xj) = φji(xi, xj) be a potential function of the
two-player game between i and j with utilities uij(xi, xj)
and uji(xj , xi) and let
φ(x) =
1
2
∑
i,j∈S:
(i,j)∈E
φij(xi, xj) +
∑
i∈S,j∈R:
(i,j)∈E
uij(xi, xj) .
Then, φ(x) is a potential function of the game u(y).
We are now ready to apply Theorem 1 to the mixed
network coordination anti-coordination game introduced in
Example 1. We do that after introducing the following
definition of cohesiveness, first introduced in [6].
Definition 6 (Cohesiveness): In a graph G = (V, E), a
subset of nodes R ⊆ V is cohesive if
wRi ≥ wSi , S = V \ R ,
for every node i in R, where
wRi = |Ni ∩R| , wSi = |Ni ∩ S| .
The following result first appeared in the master thesis [7].
Corollary 1: Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph and
let Vc ⊆ V , Va = V \Vc be subsets of players. Let u in U be
the mixed network coordination/anti-coordination game with
set of coordinating players Vc and set of anti-coordinationg
players Va. If Vc is cohesive in G, then u admits a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium y∗ (in fact at least two).
Proof: Let u and u(z) for z in XVa , be the games in
UVc defined as in (18) and (17), respectively, with R = Vc
and S = Va. Observe that u coincides with the coordination
game on the induced graph GVc . Hence, any consensus vector
y = ±1 in XVc is a Nash equilibrium of the game u and
(12) implies that
χui (y
∗) = 2wRi , ∀i ∈ R . (22)
Since ||uij ||∞ ≤M = 1 for every (i, j) in E , and the set Vc
is cohesive in G, (22) implies that
χui (y
∗) = 2wRi ≥ 2MwSi , ∀i ∈ R ,
so that (21) holds true. Then, assumption (a) of Theorem 1
is satisfied by any consensus vector y∗ = ±1 in XR.
On the other hand, since a two-player anti-coordination
game is a potential game and the graph G is undirected, by
applying Proposition 5 with S = Va we get that for every
y in XVc , the game u(y) in UVa is a potential game, hence
it admits at least one Nash equilibrium z∗(y) in XVa . Then,
assumption (b) of Theorem 1 is satisfied.
Theorem 1 then implies that, for every consensus vector
y∗ = ±1 in XVc , the strategy profile (y∗, z∗(y∗)) in X is
a Nash equilibrium of the mixed network coordination/anti-
coordination game u, thus proving the claim.
Corollary 1 provides a sufficient graph-theoretic condi-
tion for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in
mixed network coordination-anticoordination games: cohe-
siveness of the set of coordinating agents. As observed,
existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for mixed network
coordination-anticoordination games cannot be guaranteed in
general. E.g., in the special case of a simple graph with
Fig. 4: Graph G for Example 6. The set Vc is marked in
green.
Fig. 5: Representation of two Nash equilibria for the mixed
game of Example 6.
two nodes connected by an undirected link, where the first
node is coordinating and the other one is anti-coordinating,
this reduces to the discoordination game which is well-
known not to admit pure strategy Nash equilibria. Corollary
1 significantly generalizes previous works where existence
of pure strategy Nash equilibria was proved only for pure
coordination or anti-coordination games [3].
We conclude this section with following example illustrat-
ing concretely how Corollary 1 can be applied.
Example 6: Consider the mixed coordination/anti-
coordination game u on the graph G = (V, E) represented in
Figure 4, with set of coordinating players Vc = {7, 8, 9, 10}
and set of anti-coordinating players Va = V \ Vc. Vc is a
cohesive set in G, so we can construct a Nash equilibrium
for u by combining a consensus configuration y∗ in XVc for
players in Vc with a configuration z∗(y∗) of the remaining
players Va which maximizes the potential of the resulting
anti-coordination game u(y
∗) in UVa . In this way we obtain
the two Nash configurations represented in Figure 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the robustness of Nash
equilibria of finite games. First we have introduced a notion
of margin of robustness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of a game and shown how it can be computed explicitly by a
simple formula. Then, we have refined this notion in order to
study subgames suitably defined by restricting the player set
of game to a subset. Finally, we have shown how these results
can be applied to network games, in particular proving some
graph-theoretical sufficient conditions for the existence of a
pure strategy Nash equilibria for mixed coordination/anti-
coordination games.
We consider these results as a promising preliminary study
that is worth being extended in several directions, including:
(i) solving for the maximally robust Nash equilibrium in
finite games with multiple equilibria; (ii) generalizing the
notion of margin of robustness by considering different
norms for the game perturbations; (iii) extending the notion
of robustness of Nash equilibria to learning dynamics for
games, e.g., best response and noisy best response dynamics.
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